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and has punctured the illusions held by some 67 that the Webb law gave export
associations a blanket exemption from the Sherman Act. Above all, however,
the Alkasso case suggests the possibility that the exemption granted by the
Webb Act may prove to be meaningless if the Act's provisos are properly
enforced.
TEMPORAL ASPECTS OF THE FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FEDERAL RULE 60(b)
A prime function of legal systems is the settling of controversies. Settling
implies ending, and ending implies finality. Ordinarily, then, when final judg-
ment is entered in a cause, all that remains is execution, the transmuting of law
into force.
But there is yet another prime function of law, and that is to do justice be-
tween parties. judgment settles controversies; but the settlement may not
necessarily be the most just. Common-sense notions of justice would seem to
require that decisions be changed when they do not correspond with prevalent
notions of right.
The law has gradually been dvolving techniques to allow the victims of in-
correct "final" judgments to secure relief in court. The process has been long
and slow. The desire for absolute finality is strong, and satisfies both aesthetic
and administrative needs. Techniques of appeal and rehearing allow correction
of lower court misapplication of law. The development of techniques for work-
ing substantial justice has been more difficult in cases where defects of fact
rather than of law exist in the judgment, and the time for appeal or rehearing
has passed.
At common law a judgment could be set aside during the same term of
court at which it was entered., Ordinarily, a judgment could not subsequently
be set aside. Certain types of writs were available to set aside judgments after
term, but these were not clearly defined, were cumbersome, and made no pre-
tense of covering all the deserving cases. The two chief writs of this type were
the writs of audita querela and coram nobis. Audita querela2 lay chiefly for
67 See note 4 supra. Fortune Magazine also referred to Judge Kaufman's decision as intro-
ducing a "'new' Webb Act." Fortune, Dec. 1949, p. i86.
i Hen. IV, c. 3 (i4o9): "The records and process of pleas real and personal ... on which
judgment was entered and enrolled ... shall not be in any manner amended or impaired...
in any term after such judgment... was entered and enrolled." Co. Litt. *26o(a): "Yet during
the term wherein any judicial act is done, the record remaineth in the breast of the judges of
the court, and in their remembrance, and, therefore, the roll is alterable during that term, as
the judges shall direct; but when the term is past, then the record is in the roll, and admitteth
of no alteration, averment, or proof to the contrary." See also Wooden & Elizabeth's case, x
Leon. 132 (i588); Blackamore's case, 8 Co. i56(a) (i6ii); 3 Bl. Comm. *407; Hardy v. Cath-
cart, i Marsh C. P. i8o, z83 (1814); Waldo v. Spencer, 4 Conn. 71:(1821); Richardson v.
Hunt, 7 R.I. 543 (1863)-
2 The writ is of considerable antiquity. "Briefs de audita querela" are spoken of in the
Mirror of Justices (Bk. 5, c. i, § i4o) which was written in the late thirteenth century. On
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fraud on the part of the movent's adversary, or where "matter in discharge"
had arisen since the time of judgment. Coram nobis3 (or coram vobis)4 was
used to obtain relief in cases of error of fact material to the validity of the
judgment, and which had not been put into issue-the infancy or coverture of
the defendant, for example. Audita querela was obsolete by Blackstone's time,
having been driven out of use by the "indulgence of the courts in granting sum-
mary relief on motion."s The writ is available, at least theoretically, in a few
American jurisdictions,6 but is almost as rare as trial by ordeal. Coram nobis
is extensively used in a few states,7 but in the rest it is only a memory.
the function of the writ, see in general Fitz-Herbert Nat. Brev. *IO4; Rastell's Termes de ]a
Ley 63 (7o8); 3 Bl. Comm. *405-6; Bac. Abr. Tit. Audita Querela; Stone v. Seaver, 5 Vt. 549
(1833).
3 This writ apparently branched off from the ordinary writ of error and became distinct.
See Fitz-Herbert Nat. Brev. *20; Dyer 195 (1561); Co. Litt. *259 (b); Odell v. Moreton, Cro.
Jac. 254 (i6io); Strode v. The Staffordshire Justices, i Brock. 162, Fed. Cas. No. r3,537 (18io).
For the modem usage of coram nobis see Orfield, The Writ of Error Comm Nobis in Civil
Cases, 20 Va. L. Rev. 423 (1934); 1 Freeman on Judgments § 257 (5th ed. 1925); t Black on
Judgments § 299 (1891).
4 The distinction between coram nobis and coram vobis is purely historical. It is based on
whether the writ is directed to the court of King's Bench or Common Pleas. Tidd's Practice
1136; Devereux v. Roper, i Phila. Rep. 64 (Pa., i85x).
Another ancient writ the effect of which was to upset a prior judgment was the writ of
attaint. In Blackstone's description, this lay "to inquire whether a jury of twelve men gave
a false verdict; that so the judgment following thereupon may be reversed; and this must be
brought in the lifetime of him for whom the verdict was given; and of two at.least of the jurors
who gave it." 3 BI. Comm. *402-4o3; see also Fitz-Herbert Nat. Brev. *io5.
The writ is of great antiquity. It was first used in the thirteenth century. i Holdsworth
History of English Law 162; Bracton *292 ff.; Britton *237-246; Mirror of justices, Bk. 3,
c. 33-34. For an even older method of upsetting judgments, cf. Glanville, Bk. 8, c. 9. The use
of the writ of attaint was at first very narrow, but it was extended by statute to cover a
wider variety of cases than fell within the compass of the original writ. 3 Edw. I, c. 38 (1275);
i Edw. III, c. 6 (1327); 5 Edw. III, c. 7 (1331); 28 Edw. III, c. 8 (1354); 34 Edw. III, c. 7
(r36o). The writ fell into disrepute and became obsolete long before the time of Blackstone.
Hyde, C.J., at i Keble 864 (1664); Jacobs Law Dictionary, art. "Attaint" (7th ed., z756); 3
B1. Comm. *4o4 ("I have observed few instances of an attairit in our books, later than the
sixteenth century").
Blackstone also speaks of "the writ of deceit, or action on the case in the nature of it,"
which could be brought "in the court of common pleas, to reverse a judgment there had by
fraud or collusion in a real action, whereby lands and tenements have been recovered to the
prejudice of him that hath right." 3 BI. Comm. *405; see also Fitz-Herbert Nat. Brev. *95
("writ of disceit").
53 BI. Comm. *406; Bingham Law and Practice of Judgments and Executions 264 n. (e)(185).
6 Fla. Comp. Gen. Laws Ann. (Skillman, 194) c. 52, § 20; Me. Rev. Stat. (1944) c. 114,
§§ I-7; Mass. Ann. Laws ('944) c. 249, § i; Vt. Pub. Laws (I947), §§ 2148, 2154; Di Paola
v. Seppala, 336 Ill. App. 344, 83 N.E. 2d 889 (i949); Robertson v. Commonwealth, 279 Ky.
762, X32 S.W. 2d 69 (I939).
7 See Orfield, The Writ of Error Coram Nobis in Civil Cases, 20 Va. L. Rev. 423 (934). In
some jurisdictions the writ was abolished but the substance was retained. Ill. Ann. Stat.(Smith-Hurd, 1948) c. 11o, § r96: "The writ of error coram nobis is hereby abolished, and all
errors in fact ... which by the common law could have been corrected by said writ may be
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Despite these quaint exceptions, and even assuming that some sort of time
limit is necessary, the term rule is clearly inequitable. Judgments taken toward
the end of the term are more "stable" than judgments taken at the beginning
of the term. This inequity is most evident in cases where the judgment has
been entered on the last day of the term and the motion to vacate filed on the
first day of the next term. The common reaction of a court to such a situation
is to grant the motion by any readily available means.8
Thus it does not surprise us that in most American jurisdictions the term
rule has been tampered with, either by judicial evolution,9 or by statute. The
result of these statutes is to impose a uniform time period, measured from the
date the judgment was obtained, during which judgments may be upset
irrespective of the expiration of the judicial term. In Illinois and several other
states a thirty-day limit has been set up in place of the term. 0 In Kentucky
there is a sixty-day limit." In other states limits of six months, 2 one year, 3
corrected by the court in which the error was committed upon motion in writing, made at any
time within 5 years after the rendition of final judgment in the case...."
In the federal courts coram nobis and coram vobis became obsolete procedurally very early,
and were supplanted by motion, which would be granted only if the case fell under the old
common-law categories. Pickett v. Legerwood, 7 Pet. (U.S.) 144, 147 (1833).
8 See Salus v. Fogel, 302 Pa. 268, 153 Atl. 547 (1931); Kantor v. Herd, 276 Pa. 519, 120
Atl. 450 (1923).
9 "A trial court has control over its judgments during the term at which they are rendered
and afterwards, and possesses inherent power, for sufficient reasons, to order a final judgment
vacated ... but whether this power shall be exercised in any given instance rests solely in
the sound discretion of the court." Horiconv. Langlois' Estate, 1i5 Vt. 8I, 52 A. 2d 888 (1947).
See St. Pierre v. Beauregard, 1O3 Vt. 258, 152 At. 914 (1931); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Foster,
88 Vt. 503, 93 Atl. 258 (1915); Farmer's Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 52 Vt. 405 (188o);
Mosseaux v. Brigham, 19 Vt. 457 (1847); Adams v. Howard, 14 Vt. 158 (1842); Scott v.
Stewart 5 Vt. 57 (1833). Needless to say, the vast majority of the courts of the country are
unaware of this "inherent" power which the Vermont court has discovered in itself.
'oAla. Code (294o) §§ 13-114, I3-119; Pate v. State, 244 Ala. 396, 14 So. 2d 251 (i943);
Ill. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1948) c. 110, § i74; Barnard v. Michael, 392 Ill. 13o, 63 N.E. 2d
858 (i945); Illinois Nat. Bank of Springfield v. Gwinn, 390 Ill. 345, 6x N.E. 2d 249 (I943);
Broadway Motor Co. v. Public Fire Ins. Co., 12 Tenn. App. 278 (193o); Durham Coal Co. v.
Bischel, 4 Tenn. App. 233 (1927); Gammel's Ann. Rules of Civ. Proc. in Texas, Rule 33o
(1948); Joy v. Young, 194 S.W. 2d 159 (Tex. Civ. App., 1946).
In Maryland "the period of thirty days has been substituted in the law courts of Baltimore
city," though elsewhere in the jurisdiction the term rule is in force. North v. Town Real Estate
Corp., 6o A. 2d 665 (Md., x948); Armour Fertilizer Works v. Brown, i85 Md. 273, 44 A. 2d
753 (1945); Harvey v. Slacum, i81 Md. 206, 29 A. 2d 276 (1942).
"Ky. Rev. Stat. (1943) § 451.13o. This applies only to courts of "continuous session,"
that is, courts with no fixed term. See Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 293 Ky. 270, x68 S.W. 2d
738 (1943); Stratton & Terstegge Co. v. Begley, 249 Ky. 632, 6i S.W. 2d 287 (1933).
12 Ariz. Code Ann. (939) § 21-1502; Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) § 473; Colo. Code of
Civ. Proc. (194I) Rule 6o(b); Idaho Code Ann. (1947) § 5-905; Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1949)
§ 93-3905; Nev. Comp. Laws (1929) § 864o; R.I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 535, § 2; Utah Rev.
Stat. (933) § 104-14-4.
13 Ark. Civ. Code Ann. (Crawford, 1947) § 29-506; Iowa Code (1946) §§ 683, 683.1; Mich.
Stat. Ann. (Henderson, i938) § 27.1433; Minn. Stat. (Mason, i945) § 544.32; N.C. Gen.
Stat. (Michie, 1943) § 1-22o; N.D. Rev. Code (944) § 28-2901; Ohio Code Ann. (Throck-
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two years, 4 and even three years's have been established. Typically, ground for
relief is "mistake, inadvertence, or surprise"; some statutes include fraud as a
ground.,6 In Louisiana a more stringent rule than the term rule is in force, since
judgments are ordinarily unimpeachable after the passage of three judicial
days."7 Of course, when the time limit set up by statute is shorter than the dura-
tion of the term, uniformity has been achieved at the expense of litigants who
obtain their judgments in the early part of the term. In the remaining states
the term rule is the law. Few states, however, proclaim the rule in its pure
form; most jurisdictions which still retain it have riddled it with exceptions.'
morton, 1948) §§ r1631, 11640; Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) § 1-1007; S.C. Code of Laws
(1942) § 495; Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932 )8M 464, 466; Wisc. Stat. (Brossard,
1935) § 269.46. The amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6o(b) has been adopted in New
Mexico. N. Mex. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1949) § 19-101.
'4Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 2-2603; Kan. Gen. Stat. (Corrick, 1936) §§ 6o-3oo7,
6o-3oo8; Neb. Rev. Stat. (948) §§ 25-2001, 25-2oo8; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Ann. (Cahill, 1937)
§§ 522, 523, 528; Okla. Stat. Ann. (1942) §§ 12-1031, IO38; Wyo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Courtright,
1946) §§ 3-3801, 3-38o.
"5 Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1946) § 548.14 (fraud only). By statute in Georgia, Ga. Code (1933)
§ g958, "[Tlhe motion in arrest of judgment must be made during the term at which
such judgment was obtained, while a motion to set it aside may be made at any time within the
statute of limitations." However, the grounds for such a motion are very limited. See Miraglia
v. Bryson, 182 Ga. 828, III S.E. 655 (1922), and Frazier v. Beasley, 59 Ga. App. 500, i S.E.
2d 458 (939).
In Connecticut the term rule is officially in force, Clover Farms v. Kielwasser, 134 Conn.
622, 59 A. 2d 550 (948); Clark v. The Connecticut Co., 132 Conn. 400, 402, 44 A. 2d 7o6
(1945), but the "new trial" statute of Connecticut accomplishes the same purpose as the
vacation statutes of other states. A new trial may be granted for "mispleading, the discovery
of new evidence, or want of actual notice of the suit to any defendant ... or for other reason-
able cause according to the usual rules in such cases.. . ," and the petition for new trial
shall be brought "within three years next after the rendition of the judgment or decree com-
plained of. . . ." Conn. Rev. Stat. (x949) §§ 8oi3, 8322.
x6 The statutes of Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Ohio, Washington, and Wyoming,
for example.
17 La. Civ. Code Ann. (Dart., 1945) arts. 558, 56o, 563.3; Albritton v. Nauls, 15 So. 2d
x26 (La. App., 1943); Jefferson v. Lauri N. Truck Line, ii So. 821 (La. App., 1938), aff'd
187 So. 44, 192 La. 29 (i939); see Flory & McMahon, The New Federal Rules and Louisiana
Practice, z La. L. Rev. 45, 75 (i938).
In Massachusetts, according to recent authority, judgments are "ordinarily unimpeach-
able" as soon as rendered. Amory v. Kelley, 3o9 Mass. 162, 34 N.E. 2d 507 (194); Barnes v.
Smith, IO4 Mass. 363 (1780). But there are all sorts of exceptions, including writ of error, on
which there is a six-year time limit. Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1933) c. 250, H8 I-IS; i6 Mass.
L. Q. 227 (1931).
is In Delaware, the term rule is in force, Szymanski v. Buchanan, 58 A. 2d 428, 430 (Del.,
1947), Tweed v. Lockton, 5 W. W. Harr. (Del.) 474, 167 Atl. 703 (1932), but "where it
has appeared from the record ... that the defendants have been deprived of rights given them
by law, judgments have been vacated" after the term. Webb Packing Co. v. Harmon, 8
W. W. Harr. (Del.) 476, 193 Ath. 596 (i937). For a less vague enumeration of the exceptions
to the cerm rule in Delaware, see Smulski v. H. Feinberg Furniture Co., 8 W. W. Harr. (Del.)
451, 193 Ath. 585 (I937).
In Florida, a motion to vacate after term may be considered "if there was fraud, collusion,
deceit, or mistake in the procuring of the judgment." Zemurray v. Kilgore, 13o Fla. 317, 177
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The most radical and carefully planned development in this field has taken
place in the federal courts. The evolution since 1938 under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure is indicative of the changing trends in this field.
Prior to the adoption, in 1938, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
term rule held sway in the federal courts. 9 By the adoption of Rule 6o(b), a
"reasonable time" criterion was adopted in place of the term rule, but this
So. 714, 718 (I937); State v. Wright, 107 Fla. 178, I45 So. 598 (1932); Alabama Hotel Co.
v. Mott Iron Works, 86 Fla. 6o8, 98 So. 825 (1923); but see State v. Williams, i47 Fla. 514,
3 So. 2d i52 (i94i).
In Mississippi, "where the court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties
and renders judgment, it is without power to set aside such judgment after the term of court
has elapsed." Strain v. Gayden, 197 Miss. 353, 20 So. 2d 697 (1945); Ex parte Stanfield, 89
Miss. 214, 53 So. 538 (19xo).
In Missouri the term rule is in force, except that a motion in the nature of a writ of error
coram nobis may be brought after the term has ended. City of St. Louis v. Franklin Bank,
351 Mo. 688, 173 S.W. 2d 837 (94,3); Smith v. Smith, 350 Mo. 104, 164 S.W. 2d 921 (1942);
Aetna Ins. Co. v. O'Malley, 342 Mo. 8o0, ii8 S.W. 2d 3 (i938).
Officially, the term rule is in force in Pennsylvania, but the cases present all sorts of "ex-
ceptions"-default judgments, judgments by confession, judgments obtained through fraud
or misrepresentation. See Clendenning v. Pearson, 62 D. & C. 142 (Pa., 1947); Dellacasse v.
Floyd, 332 Pa. 218, 2 A. 2d 86o (1938); Dormont Motors, Inc. v. Hoerr, 132 Pa. Super. 567,
i A. 2d 493 (1938) ("circumstances that presented a strong reason for equitable relief");
Cesare v. Caputo, ioo Pa. Super. i88 (i93o); Hambleton v. Yocum, 1o8 Pa. 304 (1885);
O'Donnell v. Flanigan, 9 Pa. Super. 136, 139 (1898) ("extraordinary cause"); Mather's Execu-
tor v. Patterson, 33 Pa. 485, 487 (1859); Stephens v. Cowan, 6 Watts (Pa.) 511, 513 (X837). A
Pennsylvania jurist of a century ago said: "I cannot help thinking that the assertion, so often
made, that no Court can reverse or amend its own final judgments for errors of fact or law,
after the term at which they were entered is, so far as our practice is concerned, little else
than a humbug, useful only to frighten ignorance and rashness from meddling with matters
too great for their comprehension.... It was applied in England to prevent alteration of the
records after enrollment. But here they are never enrolled .... The fact is, we amend, open,
and set aside judgments not only after a term, but after years, governed only by the facts and
equity of the case." Lowrie, J., in Stephens v. Stephens, i Phila. Rep. (Pa.) zo8, 1o9 (1850).
In West Virginia, the term rule is applied rather strictly, although there are admittedly
"exceptions." Baker v. Gaskins, 128 W.Va. 427,.36 S.E. 2d 893 (1946); see State v. De Berry,
130 W.Va. 418, 43 S.E. 2d 408 (1947); Chaney v. State Compensation Comm'r, 127 W.Va.
521, 33 S.E. 2d 284 (1945); Helms v. Greenbriar Valley Cold Storage Co., 65 W.Va. 203, 63
S.E. io89 (i9o9); Barbour County Court v. O'Neal, 42 W.Va. 295, 26 S.E. 182 (1896).
19 New England Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Willcuts, 55 F. 2d 983 (Minn., 1931); United
States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55 (1914); Ex parte Sibbald v. United States, 12 Pet. (U.S.) 488
(1838); Cameron v. McRoberts, 3 Wheat. (U.S.) 591 (1i8); Hudson & Smith v. Guestier,
7 Cranch (U.S.) 1 (182); Moore & Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 55 Yale L. J.
623, 627 (1946). Only the old writs of coram nobis, coram vobis and audita querela at law, and
bill of review and bill in the nature of a bill of review at equity, might be brought to upset a
judgment even after the expiration of the term. New England Furniture & Carpet Co. v.
Willcuts, supra; United States v. Mayer, supra; Ex parte Sibbald v. United States, supra;
Moore & Rogers, op. cit. supra. Audita querela: Humphreys v. Leggett, 9 How. (U.S.) 296,
312 (i85o); 3 Moore, Federal Practice § 6o.o3 (1938). Judgments which a court considered
void could be set aside at any time. United States v. Sotis, 131 F. 2d 783 (C.A. 7th, 1942); see
Phelan v. Bradbury Bldg. Corp. 7 F.R.D. 429 (N.Y., 1947); Simonds v. Norwich Union In-
demnity Co., 73 F. 2d 412, 415 (C.A. 8th, i934). This last washardly an exception, since such a
judgment was considered a nullity; it "never had existed."
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period was never to exceed six months.2° Experience demonstrated however
that the rule suffered in some respects from poor draftsmanship. These defects
were cured by judicial implementation.21 Substantial changes were made in
20 Young v. Garrett, 159 F. 2d 634 (C.A. 8th, 1947); Wallace v. United States, 142 F. 2d
240 (C.A. 2d, x944); Cassell v. Barnes, i F.R.D. i5 (D.C., x939).
The ancestor of the present rule in federal courts covering the subject of relief from judg-
ments, contained in the first draft of the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure,
was timid and nonrevolutionary. Preliminary Draft of Rules of Civil Procedure for the Dis-
trict Courts of the United States, May, 1936, Rule 66(b), at rix; see Report of the Advisory
Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure containing Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure for the
District Courts of the United States, April 1937, Rule 57 (b), at 143. It provided for relief
from judgments on the grounds of "accident, mistake, surprise or inadvertence; fraud, mis-
representation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; material evidence newly discovered."
The grounds for relief provided were far more liberal than most state statutes. When it came
to imposing a time limit however, this early provision was amazingly niggardly. Relief was to
be granted "[o]n motion duly made.., before the time for appeal has expired." The rule
ended with a clause saving to the court its power to "entertain an independent action to
relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment. .. ." This clause was felt by the
Committee to retain "what was formerly known as a bill of review." This clause was retained
in the rule as adopted, and was later interpreted by the courts to preserve the whole battery
of ancient remedies. Coram nobis: McGinn v. United States, 2 F.R.D. 562 (Mass., 1942);
Preveden v. Hahn, 36 F. Supp. 952 (N.Y., 1941). Coram vobis: McGinn v. United States,
supra; Cavallo v. Agwilines, 2 F.R.D. 526 (N.Y., 1942); Preveden v. Hahn, supra. Audita
querela: Oliver v. City of Shattuck, 157 F. 2d i5o (C.A. ioth, 1946); see Assmann v. Fleming,
159 F. 2d 332, 335 (C.A. 8th, 1947). Bill of review: United States v. Certain Lands in Town of
Highlands, 82 F. Supp. 432 (N.Y., 1946); Norris v. Camp, i44 F. 2d i, 4 (C.A. ioth, i944);
Safeway Stores v. Coe, x36 F. 2d 77I (App. D.C., I943); Fraser v. Doing, 13o F. 2d 617 (App.
D.C., 1942); Preveden v. Hahn, 36 F. Supp. 952 (N.Y., 1941); Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co. v. Wardman Real Estate Properties, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 685 (D.C., I940); see Inter-
national Ry. Co. v. Davidson, 65 F. Supp. 58, 6o (N.Y., 1945); I. & I. Holding Corp. v.
Greenberg, 151 F. 2d 570, 572 (C.A. 2d, i945).
By Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(c), the term rule was specifically abolished.
2 Rule 6o(b) spoke, for example, of "judgments, orders, and proceedings." Clearly final
judgments, orders, and proceedings were meant, but the rule did not say so expressly. The
word "final" was promptly inserted by the courts. See Bailey v. Proctor, i66 F. 2d 392, 395
(C.A. 1st, 1948). As a result, the operation of 6o(b) in cases of bankruptcy was limited, since
"no order in bankruptcy is final (in the sense that it cannot be reopened) until the proceeding
has been terminated." Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America v. Reiley, 153 F. 2d 296, 298
(C.A. 2d, 1945); see Grand Union Equipment Co. v. Lippner, 167 F. 2d 958, 96i (C.A. 2d,
1948) where it is said of 6o(b) that "its scope in bankruptcy is at most limited. For it is
now settled that it is applicable only to final orders."
Similarly, Rule 6o(b) did not mention fraud as a ground for the vacation of judgments. In
Fiske v. Buder, 125 F. 2d 841 (C.A. 8th, 1942) this omission was "filled in" by the court, at
least insofar as "extrinsic fraud" was concerned.
Under Rule 6o(b) it was further decided that error of the court, and most emphatically
error of law on the part of the court, was not grounds for the vacation of a judgment. Hill v.
Hawes, 132 F. 2d 569 (App. D.C., r942) (error of the court); Jusino v. Morales & Tio, i39 F.
2d 946 (C.A. 1st, z944) (error of law); In re Barnett, 124 F. 2d Ioo5 (C.A. 2d, 1942) (error
of law); Fleming v. Miller, 47 F. Supp. ioo4 (Minn., 1942) (error of law); Nachod v. Automatic
Signal Corp., 32 F. Supp. 588 (Conn., 1940) (error of law). Nor could Rule 6o(b) be invoked
where the district court decision had been affirmed by a higher court. Maddrix v. Dize, 61 F.
Supp. 946 (Md., 1945); Albion-Idaho Land Co. v. Adams, 58 F. Supp. 579 (Idaho, 1945);
Home Indemnity Co. v. O'Brien, I2 F. 2d 387 (C.A. 6th, 194o). In Miller v. United States,
114 F. 2d 267, 269 (C.A. 7 th, i94o), it is said that "the District Court has no authority to
to vacate a judgment by it entered in an action at law, after an appeal from said judgment
has been taken."
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Rule 6o(b), however, by the amendments to the Federal Rules adopted in
1948.22 These changes incorporated the experiences of the courts with Rule 6o(b)
in a clear and workmanlike manner. The time limitation was extended; the
situations under which relief would be given were clarified and expanded; the
overlapping and obsolete writs not subject to the general rule were eliminated.
Furthermore, a fundamental change in the underlying theory was incorporated.
The term rule had been based on the idea that judgments should become irrevo-
cable in a short time. The salutary changes incorporated in the original formu-
lation of Rule 6o(b), in the suggested amendments thereto, and in the various
state statutes, accept this underlying notion without question. But the new
rule embodies a dramatic change, a departure from previous theory, specifically
rejecting the applicability of the fixed time limit concept to certain categories.
In amended Rule 6o(b), as finally adopted, the last three clauses are not
subject to the general one-year time limitation; but it is only in the last clause,
clause 6, that the departure from the fixed time limit concept is readily appar-
ent. Clause 4 involves the situation where the "judgment is void." By definition,
a motion to vacate such a judgment can be subject to no time limit. Clause 5
tells us that a judgment may be vacated when it has been "satisfied, released,
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated,23 or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application." The second phrase refers to a type of relief formerly
available under the writ of audita querela24 and hence was always an exception
to the term rule. The language is rather broad and probably will be spelled out
only by a long process of judicial trial and error. Clause 6 is the broadest of all:
"any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."25
Coming at the end of a broad enumeration of grounds for the vacation of
judgments, the first three clauses of which are subject to a one-year time
limitation, the presence of a catch-all , clause, subject to no time limitation
might lead us to infer that in the federal courts judgments are never final at all.
The cases which invoke 6o(b) as amended are as yet few. By far the most
The old categories (mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect) were left in-
tact. The writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, bills of review, and bills in the
nature of bills of review were specifically abolished, however, and the type of remedy afforded
by those writs was incorporated into the new rule. Second Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, May
1945, at 69-73. Thus, clause 2 of amended Rule 6o0(b) speaks of "newly discovered evidence,"
which was formerly a basis for obtaining a bill of review. Similarly, clause 3 treats of "fraud
... misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party," replacing the writ of audita
querela. The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud was abolished. The time limi-
tation was increased to one year, and made applicable to all the above cases.
23 Block v. Thousandfriend, 17o F. 2d 428 (C.A. 2d, 1948).
24 Moore, Federal Rules and Official Forms ii77 (1949).
2 SMoore, op. cit. supra note 24, calls it a "statement of residual power in the court." His
opinion is that since the "intendment of Rule 6o(b) is that the rule be inclusive, some state-
ment of residual power is necessary."
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important case decided under it is Klapprott v. United States,"2 which presents
the strongest indications yet available for the direction federal courts will take
in the future.
August N. Klapprott was a German-American citizen, naturalized in 1933
in New Jersey. On May 15, 1942 the United States filed suit in the District
Court of New Jersey to set aside the certificate of naturalization, on the
grounds that Klapprott, a German sympathizer, had perjured himself. Klap-
prott was served with notice but did not answer. In July 1942 judgment by
default was entered by the district court. Klapprott had been arrested ten days
previously on criminal charges of conspiracy to violate the Selective Service
Act. He was convicted on these charges and sent to prison. In 1945 the Supreme
Court reversed his conviction. In 1946 he was taken from prison to Ellis Island
to be deported. On December 12, 1946, Klapprott filed a petition through his
attorney in the New Jersey district court asking that the default judgment be
vacated and that he be granted a trial on the merits. The district court dis-
missed Klapprott's motion, chiefly on the grounds that the petitioner was
barred by his laches. 7 The circuit court affirmed this decision.2" The Supreme
Court reversed the two lower court decisions by a 5-4 margin, set aside the
judgment, and granted Klapprott a hearing on the merits. The decision was
later modified to allow Klapprott merely to offer proof of the allegations in his
complaint. Seven and one-half years had gone by since Klapprott had been
denaturalized.
It is obvious from a reading of the case that the court was moved by the
plight of the denaturalized citizen. But the legal basis assigned for the decision
is to be found in amended Rule 6o(b), which had gone into effect between the
date of the circuit court decision and the Supreme Court reversal.
The "majority" 9 opinion of Justice Black suggested that it was very likely
that a default judgment in denaturalization cases unsupported by proof was
void, and hence could be set aside at any time under clause 4 of 6o(b). But even
if this were not so, he continues, the facts of the case were enough to bring it
under the catch-all phrase in clause 6. Anticipating the argument of Reed's
"335 U.S. 6oi (x949), modified 336 U.S. 942 (i949).
27 United States v. Klapprott, 6 F.R.D. 45o (N.J., 1947).
28 Klapprott v. United States, i66 F. 2d 273 (C.A. 3d, 1948).
9 Joined in only by Justice Douglas. Justice Rutledge wrote a special concurring opinion in
which Justice Murphy joined, basing his decision on the position that a default judgment in a
denaturalization proceeding is invalid, and that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to
such proceedings. He states, however, that "upon the assumption that rules of civil procedure
may apply in denaturalization proceedings, I am substantially in accord with the views ex-
pressed by Mr. Justice Black." 335 U.S. 619, 620 (1949). The concurrence of Justice Burton "as
limited to the special facts of this case and without expressing an opinion upon any issues not
before this court," ibid., at 616, rounded out the bare majority. However, Justice Frankfurter's
dissent agreed with the majority except that he was in favor of requiring Klapprott to prove
his allegations before the judgment could be vacated. This is substantially the position taken
by the majority of the court in the modified judgment, 336 U.S. 6oi (x949).
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dissent, that all Klapprott complained of was a judgment taken because of his
"excusable neglect," which would come within the one-year time limitation ap-
plied to clause i, Black paints a touching picture: "[I]n jail... weakened from
illness, without a lawyer in the denaturalization proceedings or funds to hire
one, disturbed and fully occupied in efforts to protect himself against the
gravest criminal charges, he was no more able to defend himself in the New
Jersey court than he would have been had he never received notice of the
charges." Black's conclusion is that the petition of Klapprott does not pray for
relief merely on the grounds of "excusable neglect." "Something more" had
been alleged, for which the "other reasons" clause would grant relief. Black
denied that the force of that clause was limited to circumstances under which
the old writs of coram nobis and audita querela would lie. "In simple English,"
he stated, "the language of the 'other reasons' clause, for all reasons except
the five particularly specified, vests power in courts adequate to enable them to
vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice. ' '3°
The Klapprott case makes clear one thing: that portions of new Rule 6o(b)
give the federal courts a powerful weapon with which to upset judgments if
they but choose to use it. Rule 6o(b) was thus taken by the Court to represent
a complete departure from the underlying philosophy of the term rule, and to
substitute a new philosophy of judgments. What are the implications of this
change?
The fixed time limit concept lying behind the term rule and the statutes
modifying it was bolstered up by two justifying theories. One theory was that
courts could not upset their judgments because property rights had vested
under them, and these property rights were not to be upset. The courts repeated
this so often that they became confused, and considerations of property rights
involved were transformed into the proposition that judgments were them-
selves property, and that to upset a final judgment was to deprive someone
of property by that very act.3' Another idea that obsessed the courts was that
3o 335 U.S. 6oi, 614 (i949).
3- An extreme example is La. Civ. Code Ann. (Dart, 1942) art. 548: "A judgment, when
once rendered, becomes the property of him in whose favor it has been given; and the judge
cannot alter the same, except in the mode provided by law." In Wieland v. Shillock, 24 Minn.
345 (1877), a statute which provided for the vacation of judgments on the grounds of fraud
was held unconstitutional insofar as it applied to judgments already rendered. "At the time of
the passage of the act," said the court, "the defendant's judgment had.., become absolute,
and not subject to be set aside, reversed or modified. He had, therefore, a fixed and vested right
of property in it." Ibid., at 349. The act would "deprive the defendant of his property in the
judgment without due process of law."
In Johnson v. Jefferson, I9x Minn. 631, 255 N.W. 87 (1934), the court held that, in a claim
arising under the workmen's compensation act, where compensation was declared at an end
and the rights of the parties were finally determined and fixed, and an act was subsequently
passed giving the commission which had adjudicated the claim the right to "set aside its de-
cision.., and grant a new hearing," the relators "had a fixed and vested right in the final
determination made by the commission." Ibid., at 633 and 88. Again, the act was held repug-
nant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
Note the language of the United States Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Virginia, 172 U.S.
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after the end of the term they lost jurisdiction over the case. 32 If they had no
jurisdiction, of course, it was wrongful to hear the case.
These ideas were more often thought than expressed, and more often ex-
pressed than understood. As a result, these two theories, the "property" and
the "jurisdiction" theory, are jumbled together without any attempt at sepa-
ration and analysis. The situation would occasionally come up that both parties
would desire to set aside a judgment after term time. If the term rule is to be
based on a jurisdictional rationale, one might expect that the judgment would
not be vacated in such a situation because "consent cannot confer jurisdic-
tion." 3 Many courts have behaved this way. On the other hand, if the control-
ling theory is a property theory, then the judgment may be set aside, because
there is nothing to prevent a property owner from giving up his property if he
so desires. Many courts have behaved this way also.34
The fact that courts have failed to analyze their actions has also resulted in a
102, 123-24 (x898): "It is not within the power of a legislature to take away rights which have
been once vested by a judgment. Legislation may act on subsequent proceedings, may abate
actions pending, but when these actions have passed into judgment the power of the legisla-
ture to disturb the rights created thereby ceases." Note the emphasis on the magic effect of the
pronouncement of the judgment by the court, the oracle of the law. Pending actions may be
disturbed by the legislature, but once these actions have passed into the magical domain of
judgment, they cannot be disturbed because some sort of "title" has "vested" in them.
Of course, the crude property notions underlying many of the decisions in the field of judg-
ments are rarely made so explicit as in the above cases.
32Barnes v. Smith, 3o4 Mass. 363 (1870), is typical. Here the court says: "The petitioners
have had a day in court, and the judgment of the court is final. It has passed beyond its control
to alter or amend." Ibid., at 364. Hundreds of other cases in the field echo this sort of language.
See Moore & Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, f5 Yale L. J. 623, 629 (1946).
33 Mayor of Little Rock v. Bullock, 6 Ark. (i Eng.) 282, 283 (1845), where the court said
that "after the term ... the cause was no longer under the jurisdiction or control of the
court, or the parties .... [Clonsent cannot confer jurisdiction."; Anderson v. Thompson, 75
Tenn. (7 Lea) 259 (i88r); Moody & Co. v. Freeman, 24 Okla. 701, io4 Pac. 30 (1909);
Western Land & Irrigation Co. v. Humfeld, z38 Ore. 46, 247 Pac. 143 (1926).
34Humphreyville v. Culver, 73 Ill. 485 (1874); Gage v. City of Chicago, 141 Ill. 642, 31
N.E. 163 (1892); National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers v. Overholser, 64 Ohio St.
517, 6o N.E. 628 (igoi); Steinhagen v. Trull, 320 II. 382, 151 N.E. 25o (1926); Miller v.
Miller, 332 Ill. 177, 163 N.E. 343 (1928), a suit for partition, where the court made much of
the fact that the two parties were the "only persons who had an interest in the real estate
sought to be partitioned." Ibid., at i8o and 344; Slattery v. Uvalde Rock Asphalt Co., 140
S.W. 2d 987, 992 (Tex. Civ. App., 394o); Reisman v. Central Mfg. Dist. Bank, 316 ll. App.
373, 45 N.E. 2d 9o (1942).
Strangely enough, the most sensible solution was proposed in one of the oldest cases, Kidd
v. McMillan, 21 Ala. 325, 327 (1852), where the court said: "[Tihe question before us is,
whether the court is bound by law, even when the parties consent, to set aside a final judg-
ment, at a term subsequent to its rendition and try the case again. We think not. There must
be a time when litigation must end.... If the court was bound to retry the cause again at the
request of the parties ... the courts would be compelled ... to retry cases, to suit the
caprice or whims of the parties. This... the courts are not bound to do. True, if it is done,
we will not hold that the court acted without authority or jurisdiction. But we think the court
may refuse to retry the cause without violating any principle of law." Compare this com-
mon-sense attitude with the spirit of the provisions of amended Rule 6o(b).
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failure to realize that the two rationales upon which their action might be
based are both fallacious. The "term rule" is not a rule which results from the
jurisdiction of courts. It is a rule which defines jurisdiction. Similarly the "prop-
erty" theory is fallacious. The judgment creditor owes his claim to property of
the judgment debtor to the operation of the law. His claim is enforced by a
court only because his claim is righteous and pure. If proof is offered that his
claim is not righteous, the court certainly ought to be able to take it away from
him. There is no magic spell in the entry of a judgment. Besides, there are ob-
viously many types of cases which this rationale would not fit at all. The
Klapprott case is an outstanding example.
Clause 6 of Rule 6o(b) simply rejects these two modes of reasoning. The fear
that judgments will be unstable under clause 6 is unfounded, although, once
again, the effective import of the clause will depend on the course the courts
will take. Obviously the clause will be invoked by attorneys with increasing
frequency, especially when the one-year time limit has run against their clients.
Already a large number of cases involving aliens are being pushed in the courts,35
as lawyers take the most obvious cue from the Klapprott decision. The implica-
tions of the case go far beyond the narrow fact situation.
Courts will be inclined to be receptive, however, to cases invoking clause 6
only in extraordinary situations where the equities and public policy are
strongly in favor of the vacation of the judgment. Such a case is presented by
the Klapprott situation. Underlying the decision is a marked disinclination to
allow denaturalization without a trial on the merits. It is crucial that in the
case no "property rights" were vested by the original judgment. No injustice
was done to the federal government by giving Klapprott an opportunity to
prove that the judgment should be vacated. It is most dubious whether a sev-
eral year old judgment in a contract or tort case would be vacated by a federal
court. The motion must be made, according to Rule 6o(b), whatever the
grounds, within a "reasonable" time. The reason must "justify relief from the
operation of the judgment." As time passes after the entering of a judgment,
fewer and fewer reasons are likely to persuade a court that it would be just to
grant relief from the operation of the judgment.
The history of finality of judgments in federal courts seems thus to indicate a
trend away from an absolute time limit after which the judgment becomes un-
touchable. Crude "property" and "jurisdiction" labels have been replaced by
a more flexible standard. The law seems to be evolving a doctrine whereby
judgments gradually become more final as time passes. Arguments in terrorem
warning of the instability of court judgments are not founded on fact. Rule 6o
(b) and the Klapprott case are thus seen to be eminently realistic, despite the
fact that clause 6 may be loosely drafted. Ultimately the success of the new
3s United States v. Eichenlaub, i8o F. 2d 314 (C.A. 2d, 1950); United States v. Backofen,
176 F. 2d 263 (C.A. 3d, i949), a case involving five denaturalized aliens.
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philosophy of judgments rests in the sound discretion and good sense of the
judiciary. But then, so did the old philosophy, which was found wanting.
The good sense of this approach to the problem of finality of judgments is by
no means new. Almost a century ago, Lord Campbell, setting aside a judgment
long after the expiration of the term,36 said: "It is suggested that such a juris-
diction as this will be liable to abuse; but I do not feel that to be a forcible
argument, as the discretion of the Court is a sufficient guarantee against
abuse.... We are asked what are the limits of our jurisdiction, and whether we
could do this at any time. I answer that lapse of time becomes after a season a
bar, as soon as the Court in its discretion sees that it has been such as must
work prejudice... .'37 This philosophy is well on its way to becoming law in
the federal courts.
BOND PURCHASES AT DISCOUNT BY "INSIDER"
DURING INSOLVENCY
Directors are denied a profit on corporate obligations purchased at a discount
in three principal situations. Purchases during hopeless corporate insolvency are
considered breaches of trust. Federal bankruptcy courts apply a similar ration-
ale to acquisitions of debt which occur when reorganization proceedings are con-
templated. Where the corporation is solvent at the time of acquisition, claims
are limited to cost only on evidence of overreaching, either by purchasing in
competition with the corporation or through misrepresentation or nondisclosure
of material facts rendering the transaction inequitable to the seller.
Petitioners in the case under discussionx sought extensions of these rules and
the hesitancy of the courts tested underlying theories. Calton Crescent's sole
asset was an apartment building appraised on a 1942 sale proposal at $220,000,
valued throughout the period for tax purposes at $421,63o, and sold in 1946 for
$3oo,ooo. Its liabilities included a $i75,ooo first mortgage and $256,ooo in in-
come debentures. By obtaining loans which enabled Calton Crescent to pay
interest due on the first mortgage and tax liabilities (thus forestalling mortgage
foreclosure and tax sales), two brothers gained positions on the directorate and
later assumed management responsibilities. Throughout the following three
years the corporation was unable to meet interest payments on its first mort-
gage. During that period close relatives of the Becker brothers (their mother
36 Cannan v. Reynolds, 5 El. & B1. 3o (i855).
37 Cannan v. Reynolds, 5 El. & 31. 3o, 3o6 (1855). The opinion of Crompton, J., at 307,
is also of interest. He states that "this case falls within the principle on which we act
every day at chambers, where we set aside judgments, whether in term or out of term, on the
ground of mistake.... I do not think either that a judgment is final as soon as it is signed,
and execution executed, or that it is precarious and may be set aside at any time.... [T]he
application must be made within a reasonable time after the judgment is acted upon."
Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Becker, 338 U.S. 304 (1949), affg. sub nom. In re Calton
Crescent, Inc., 173 F. 2d 944 (C.A. 2d, 1949), aff'g. 8o F. Supp. 822 (N.Y.,1948).
